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Abstract 
Industrialization is shown as a time-specific and spatially heterogeneous 
process. The description of industrialization paths uses two concepts 
along a functional/temporal and a spatial dimension: Technology clus- 
ters, i.e., a set of interrelated technological, institutional and social 
innovations, drive particular (historical) periods of industrial output 
and productivity growth. A spatial taxonomy reflects the different 
degrees of development and intensiveness of industrialization among 
core, rim, and periphery. 
In an inductive approach, industrial growth is described through the 
prism of changes in technology clusters and the spatially heterogeneous 
diffusion of industrialization on a global scale. "Industrialization paths" 
are discussed on the basis of the USA, Western Europe, Russia and 
Japan. The quantitative description focuses on macro-level indicators 
of industrial output, and the evolution of the productivity of factor 
inputs labor and energy. Energy intensiveness and carbon emissions 
are used as metric to assess changes in the environmental impacts of 
various industrialization paths, concluding that improvements in the 
efficiency of factor input use are part of the inherent incentive structure 
of industrial evolution. However, historical improvement rates will 
have to be considerably accelerated to lower absolute levels of indus- 
trial emissions. 
Finally, the implications of industrial productivity growth and its dis- 
tribution in the form of rising incomes (consumption) and free time (lei- 
sure) are discussed inter alia from an environmental perspective. 
1. Introduction 
Industrialization is a process of structural change. Sources of produc- 
tivity and output growth as well as of employment move away from 
agriculture towards industrial activities, in particular manufacturing 
(Figures 1 and 2). Rising productivity and output in industry have 
been the main drivers for economic growth and increased national and 
per capita incomes, which in turn provide an ever enlarging market for 
industrial products for the building of social infrastructures and in form 
of consumer goods. 
Like any pervasive process of economic or social change, industrializa- 
tion is driven by the diffusion of many individual (but interrelated) 
innovations. These are not only of technical nature, but also organiza- 
tional and institutional, transforming the entire social fabric of society. 
Also technology leading to vastly rising output, improved factor pro- 
ductivity, to new forms of production, products and markets, is at the 
core of the industrialization phenomenon, social and organizational 
innovations are of no lesser importance. In fact, the term "industrial 
society" has come to describe a particular way of economic and social 
organization, from science and industrial management to the fine arts. 
An industrial society is based pervasively on the economics of standard- 
ization and specialization of human activities to produce, not only ever 
more, but paradoxically, also an ever larger variety of final products. 
Since the middle of the 18th century, the onset of what has been 
termed* the "Industrial Revolution" , global industrial output and pro- 
ductivity have risen beyond the imaginable. Table 1 summarizes a few 
macro-indicators illustrating the present size of industrial activities on 
a global scale. We also include transportation activities (ton-km tran- 
sported) because ultimately all goods tonnage shipped originates either 
as an industrial product or is processed at some stage by industry. 
From a quantitative perspective it is interesting to note that the 3 
TWyr final energy consumed (corresponding to some 3 Gt coal 
equivalent) and its related 2 Gt of carbon emissions (including emis- 
sions stemming from the generation of electricity consumed by indus- 
try) rival the tonnage of the most important (in terms of weight) com- 
modities produced and/or processed by industry. 
*This term (Toynbee, 1884) with its implicit concept of discontinuity may in fact be a mienomer, ignoring 
the important developmente in proto-industrial eocietiee paving the way to accelerated rates of change eince 
the mid-18th century. For a concise discussion see Cameron (1989). 
Table 1. Basic Activity Data, Industry, AD 1990 (Source: Economist, 1990; ILO, 1991; IRF, 1991; UN, 1990). 
$ lo6 tons G Wyr final lo6 tons lo6 people 10' value 7 major commodities1 1012 ton-km energy consumed carbon 
employed added produced transported (W/O feedstocks) emissions 2 
Market 
economies 130 4632 1095 6 1164 766 
Reforming 
economies 80 975 515 8 85 1 584 
Developing 
economies 300 1068 895 8 1116 733 
World 510 6675 2505 22 3131 2083 
1 In decreasing order of global tonnage: cement, steel, paper, fertilizer, glass, aluminum, copper. 
2 Including manufacture of cement, carbon emissions from electricity production allocated to industry in proportion of industrial to total electricity con- 
sumption. 
Industry thus is indeed a powerful agent of global change. It accounts 
for about 20 percent of employment, and 40 percent of value added, 
final energy consumption, and industrial carbon emissions, respectively. 
However, the relative weight of industry in anthropogenic activities 
varies widely in time and space primarily as a function of the degree of 
industrialization and the overall level of economic development. Espe- 
cially the dominance of industry in the material, energy and "smoke 
stackn intensive economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former USSR are clearly discernible in Table 2. 
Table 2. Industry's Share in Anthropogenic Activities, A.D. 1990. 
% Share in 
Final energy Carbon 
Employment Value Added (excl. feedstocks) emissions1 
Market 
economies 34.0 33.0 31.5 31.9 
Reforming 
economies 40.1 59.3 52.6 46.7 
Developing 
economies 16.9 36.8 36.3 47.9 
World 21.6 37.4 37.3 38.7 
1 Emissions from cement and for supply of electricity and heat included, biomass excluded. 
In this paper we will try to sketch out the pathways of industrialization 
which have brought us to the present. We will in particular discuss the 
importance of technological and social change in the industrialization 
process and the course of various industrialization paths pursued in his- 
tory. From a quantitative perspective, industrialization is indeed a suc- 
cess story in human history (though perhaps with mixed blessings). 
Based on updated estimates of Bairoch (1982), the global industrial 
output has risen by about a factor 100 since around 1750. Over the 
last hundred years, industry has grown by a factor of 40, o r  at an 
annual growth rate of about 3.5 percent per year. Per capita industrial 
production increased over the same time period by a factor of about 11, 
or at a rate of 2.3 percent per year. This means that rising per capita 
activity levels were a more powerful agent of change than human popu- 
lation growth. Despite the inherent inaccuracy of such long-term esti- 
mates, which additionally do not take into account the improvements 
in quality and variety of industrial products produced, they neverthe- 
less provide an idea about the order of magnitude of the industrializa- 
tion phenomenon. 
The growth in industrial labor productivity was even more spectacular 
than output growth. Again the data are uncertain, but even the recent 
quantitative evidence does not change the impressive account of indus- 
trial productivity growth emerging from Colin Clark's (1940) classical 
Conditions of Economic Progress. Quantitative time series on indus- 
trial productivity growth (presented in more detail in the subsequent 
discussion) indicate a factor 200 (perhaps even more) improvement 
since the middle of the 18th century. Thus, an industrial worker in the 
US produces today in one hour what took an UK laborer two weeks of 
toiling 12 hour days of work some 200 years ago. 
The growth in labor productivity perhaps best illustrates the crucial 
role of technological and organizational change in the industrialization 
process. In emphasizing technological, social and organizational inno- 
vations as drivers of industrial growth, we might ask what about 
natural resource endowments? Is the availability of energy and mineral 
resources not a conditio sine qua n o n  for industrialization? Here we are 
inclined to consider resource availability as of secondary importance, 
especially for the industrial system based on spatial division of primary 
(raw materials) and secondary (manufacturing) activities that emerged 
with the availability of transportation systems, especially in the 19th 
century (sail ships and canals, followed by railways and steam-ships). 
First, without technology no natural resource can be harvested and 
processed for input to industrial activities. Secondly, the availability 
and quantity of resources itself is also a function of technology. Geo- 
logical knowledge, exploration and production technologies, etc. are all 
important determinants for the quantity of resources available to 
humanity, and especially for the expansion of the resource base (cf. the 
case of off-shore oil). Thirdly, technology development can provide for 
substitutes such as the replacement of natural nitrate by man-made fer- 
tilizers, or natural by synthetic rubber. 
Thus, in our interpretation, the different degrees of development and 
industrialization are technology gaps resulting from differences* in 
* Note here the important enlargement of the traditional definition of comparative advantage. Whereaa the 
claseical definition revolve8 around the comparative pricee of factor inpute (reeourcee, labor, capital, etc.) 
modeled via a production function approach, "technology gape" in addition account for difference8 in combi- 
nation8 and inteneitiee of factor inpute which cannot be explained solely on basie of their price differences. 
For a more detailed discussion eee in particular Dosi c t  dl 1990. 
accumulation and innovativeness, and not from endowments or scar- 
city. Innovative capacity (and thus production, income and growth 
possibilities) is thus created (among others by an appropriate socio- 
institutional framework), and not given. 
Historical analysis indicates a number of cases where successful indus- 
trialization was achieved even with only modest national natural 
resource endowments (e.g., France, Scandinavia, Austria, Japan). Con- 
sidering the resource and environmental intensiveness of different 
industrialization paths (discussed below), the abundance of resources 
even appears as a mixed blessing as it can lead to persistently higher 
intensity trajectories of development. From such a perspective, one 
might wonder if coal-rich China will develop along the energy-intensive 
development path of the US, or alternatively along more energy- 
efficient pathways of industrialization along the French or Japanese 
experience. 
Before we proceed further with an overview of various phases of indus- 
trialization and a discussion of selected examples, we start with a few 
definitional and conceptual remarks. Any artifact or operational prac- 
tice supplanting existing ones can be considered an innovation. How- 
ever, innovations encompass a whole continuum from small-scale, incre- 
mental changes affecting a particular industrial activity, to pervasive 
changes affecting the functioning and behavior of the entire economy 
and society at large. 
1.1. A Taxonomy of Innovations 
Incremental Innovations 
Occurring more or less continuously across all industry or service 
activities, incremental improvements resulting from scientific research 
and development, engineering (e.g., the scale-up of plants and equip- 
ment) and 'learning by doingn improve the efficiency in use of all fac- 
tors of production. Although the combined effect of incremental inno- 
vations is extremely important, no single innovation by itself will have 
a dramatic effect, and in most cases it will pass unnoticed and 
unrecorded. For the present context, we note the importance of the 
cumulativeness of small incremental innovations in long-term overall 
productivity growth, but need not to be concerned to discuss them 
separately as sources of redirecting the course of industrialization. 
Radical  Innovat ions  
These are discrete and discontinuous events; in recent times usually 
being the result of deliberate research and development activities in 
industry or in universities. Radical innovations offer the possibility of 
LC quantum" leaps in productivity, overcoming resource limit at  ions, or 
the development of entire new materials, products, etc. Despite their 
radical departure from existing engineering practice and technological 
vintages, they nevertheless "tie-in" in existing industrial structures, 
requiring no radical changes in industrial organization. The introduc- 
tion of the Bessemer process, offering the possibility of low-cost, mass 
production of high quality steel in the 19th century, the introduction of 
nylon or the contraceptive pill in the 20th century are illustrative 
examples. Despite the importance for individual industrial sectors or 
sub-markets, their aggregate economic impact remains comparatively 
small and localized, unless a whole cluster of radical innovations is 
linked together to  give rise to  entirely new industries or services. 
Changes in Technological S y s t e m s  
These are far-reaching changes in technology, affecting several branches 
of industry or occurring across various sectors of the economy. They 
are combinations of both radical and incremental innovations, com- 
bined with organizational and managerial  changes. Technological 
change introduced in one level of the economy will trigger correspond- 
ing changes both upstream and downstream in related branches. A 
good example is the introduction of electric motors in industry (cf. 
Devine, 1982). This new versatile decentralized source of motive power 
(as opposed to the previously used central steam-engine and power dis- 
tribution via transmission belts) not only changed the entire way of 
organization of the shop floor, but also required associated changes 
upstream, i.e., in the production and distribution of electricity. 
Analyzing the effect of industrial drive electrification on the overall 
energy efficiency, Devine (1982) concludes that significant improve- 
ments (by a factor of three) were only achieved once these organiza- 
tional changes indeed took place both at the level of the shop floor and 
in the centralized supply and distribution of electricity generation.* 
Clusters and Families 
Some changes in technology systems are so far-reaching in their effects 
that they impact the entire economy, even nearly every aspect of daily 
life. Such a change carries whole clusters of radical and incremental 
innovations and may also embody several new technology systems. For 
instance the development of the automotive industry was contingent 
inter alia on developments in materials (high quality steel sheets), the 
chemical industries (oil refining, in particular catalytic cracking), pro- 
duction and supply infrastructures (exploration and oil production, 
pipelines and gasoline stations), development of public infrastructures 
(roads), and a host of other technological innovations. The growth of 
the industry was based on a new production organization (Fordist type 
of mass production combined with Tayloristic scientific management 
principles), yielding significant real-term cost reductions, which made 
the car affordable to a wider social strata, thus changing settlement 
patterns, consumption habits of the population, leisure activities, etc. 
In turn, the automobile is just one artifact among many consumer dur- 
ables which now belongs as a 'standard package" (Keyfitz, 1991) to 
every household in industrialized countries. 
Clusters of radical innovations and technology systems, interdependent 
and mutually cross-enhancing, give rise to whole "families" of techno- 
logical innovations with associated new institutional and organizational 
settings. Thus, interlinkages and multiplier effects are responsible for 
the pervasive impacts of such techno-institutional "clusters" on the 
economy and society. Their effects cannot be assessed in simply 
"summing-up" the individual contributions of a range of individual rad- 
ical innovations or technology systems even if detailed data were exist- 
ing. Instead, they can only be described in qualitative terms. Such 
"clusters" have been referred to in the literature under various head- 
ings such as "general natural trajectories" (Nelson and Winter, 1977) 
or as "techno-economic paradigms" (Freeman and Perez, 1988). For 
* Devine (1982) estimates the overall energy efficiency of a steam engine, coupled with mechanical power 
distribution to range between 3 to 8 percent. If only the steam engine is replaced by self-generated electrici- 
ty, while keeping group drives and mechanical power distribution, the overall energy efficiency still remains 
at  3 to 6 percent. Conversely, combining utility generated electricity and decentralized unit drives i.e., 
each equipment is driven by an independent motor) raises the energy efficiency by a factor up to three I sye- 
tems' overall efficiency of 10 to 12 percent). All efficiencies apply to the 1920s. Current overall systems en- 
ergy efficiency for industrial drives (incl. power generation, distribution, and motors) is in the order of 25 to 
28 percent, i.e., twice aa large aa 70 years ago (NakiCenovit e t  al., 1990). 
our purpose here it suffices to note that whole clusters or families of 
technologies, interwinded with associated organizational settings in the 
political, social and economic spheres, emerge to become a dominant 
development regime "regulated" (Boyer, 1988) by a supportive institu- 
tional framework. Such LLclusters" drive particular periods of economic 
growth. 
Above is essentially a Schumpeterian (1935; 1939) perspective on long- 
term economic growth and technological change. Industrial develop- 
ment is conceptualized to  come in spurts, driven by the diffusion of 
clusters of interrelated innovations and interlaced by periods of crisis, 
and intensive structural change." The existence of a succession of a 
number of such clusters over time should not give the impression that 
we deal here with various stages of a quasi linear development path 
(e.g., from textile to basic metal industries, on to mass-produced consu- 
mer durables) which can be repeated at any point in history. Instead, 
we contend that the emergence of such clusters is a time specific 
phenomenon, the success (in terms of contribution to economic growth) 
of which cannot be repeated quasi mechanistically on the same basis at  
later periods in history. 
1.2. Innovation Diffusion 
Any innovation, as radical and revolutionary it may be at  the moment 
of its introduction, has however no immediate impact on the economy 
or society at  large. I t  is only through its widespread diffusion, as it 
becomes increasingly adopted as standard production and consumption 
practice, that an innovation will have a noticeable impact. In fact the 
history of technological change entails a systematic bias in the direction 
of successful innovations. Many solutions introduced unsuccessfully in 
the past have sunk into oblivion, from the sail-powered railways to  the 
Zeppelins. Hence, any historical discussion of technological change 
risks to give the impression of technological determinism. However, in 
discussing successful innovations it is important to  keep in mind that 
* Such a diecontinuoue paths of economic development haa been corroborated by empirical etudiee ever eince 
the eeminal contribution8 of Nikolai Kondratiev (1926) and Joseph Schumpeter (1939), and received revived 
intereet in the period8 of economic crieie in the 19708 and 1980s (see e.g., van Duijn, 1983, Freeman, 1983, 
Vaako, 1987). Beyond the empirical corroboration of important hietorical diecontinuitiee however, the in- 
terpretation and theoretical explanation of euch long  wavee' of economic and social development remains 
fragmented and open to further research. In particular, the ieeuee whether we deal with a recurring, or even 
cyclical phenomenon endogenoue to the economy, and what are the (combinatione) of varioue caueality 
mechanism8 euggeeted, continue to be debated. 
these have made their way in a highly uncertain environment, being 
shaped by a complex set of economic and social forces, which however 
can only be documented in rare instances to any sufficient detail to 
comprehend the most important causality links and events which have 
given rise to a particular diffusion trajectory. 
Increasing adoption rates provide the basis to widen markets, gain 
additional experience with a given technology, develop it further and 
exploit learning curve effects and cost reductions from standardization 
and increasing economies of scale. Thus, diffusion is sustained by a 
self-reinforcing mechanism (a positive feedback) in which higher 
diffusion rates lead to increasing returns to adoption (Arthur, 1988), 
lower real-term costs and prices, ultimately also to increased product 
differentiation to occupy even most specialized market niches, etc. 
Diffusion stops either because markets become saturated, or increasing 
awareness of negative externalities associated with the further per- 
vasive adoption of particular (technological) solutions block further 
diffusion. Symmetrical to the beginning of the diffusion phase in which 
a usually large number of competing design alternatives imply high risk 
and uncertainty (but also profit opportunities) for both suppliers and 
adopters of innovations, the saturation phase of a diffusion life cycle is 
equally disruptive. Used to past periods of high growth rates, industry 
has built up overcapacities, the future development path is uncertain, 
and economic and social transaction costs towards new solutions and 
alternatives are high. 
Time 
Above brief description of innovation diffusion already points to the 
perhaps most fundamental "law" distilled from thousands of diffusion 
studies: no innovation spreads instantaneously. The studies have also 
identified an almost invariant temporal diffusion pattern: slow growth 
at the beginning, accelerating growth (via the positive feedback 
mechanism outlined above), finally to level off into saturation. Hence 
the success of epidemiological models for the description (not: explana- 
tion) of diffusion phenomena. Diffusion requires significant time, in 
most cases of any economic or social significance several decades (for a 
comparative cross-national study of technology diffusion in industry see 
Nasbeth and Ray, 1974, and Ray, 1989). In some cases (like large-scale 
and long-lived infrastructures) it may well take between half to an 
entire century to achieve complete diffusion (Griibler, 1990). 
Space 
The diffusion of innovations is also a spatial phenomenon. Originating 
from focused innovation centers, diffusion spreads out through a hierar- 
chy of sub-centers and from there further to their hinterlands (cf. 
Hagerstrand, 1967). Diffusion is therefore a spatially heterogeneous 
phenomenon. As a rule, peripheral regions tend to somewhat catch-up 
in the diffusion to early starters, albeit - as the development time is 
shorter - at significantly lower adoption levels. Thus, the intensity of 
adoption and development of particular systems is highest and most 
pervasive in those regions having first introduced an innovation and in 
which diffusion has been sustained the longest, sometimes reconfiguring 
the entire economic and social organization of society around particular 
group of artifacts (cf. the automobile in the US). Thus, inferring from 
realized diffusion levels of early starting regions/countries, likely 
market potentials for late adopters might be quite misleading. 
Acknowledging this spatial heterogeneity in analogy to past examples 
of the diffusion of pervasive systems, yields a different scenario of the 
future growth of presently dominating artifacts such as automobiles 
(Figure 3). The analysis is consistent with observed patterns in the 
temporal and spatial spread of innovations: early starters (like the US) 
having the longest sustained period of diffusion and resulting highest 
ultimate adoption levels, whereas late starters (like Japan) tend to 
catch-up, albeit at significantly lower ultimate diffusion levels. The 
latter are roughly inversely proportional to the time lag in the introduc- 
tion of particular systems. 
From such a perspective, the future is not simply "more of the same" 
but instead characterized by the development and diffusion of new sys- 
tems, better adapted to changing social and economic requirements. 
And we may add also environmental boundary conditions as a possible 
new decisive force shaping the further diffusion of existing and the 
introduction of new technologies. 
To operationalize this spatial heterogeneity we use concepts developed 
within the framework of social geography. Regions leading the 
diffusion of particular systems and having highest adoption levels are 
referred to here as "core." The fact that they show in many respects 
similar development patterns with small temporal lags is an indication 
of their high degree of interconnectedness (information exchange, com- 
munication, trade flows, e t ~ . ) .  In decreasing order of the time lag and 
the diffusion intensity in the development of particular systems (and 
also in the degree of interconnectedness and extent of communication 
with the core), we differentiate between rim and periphery. In fact, 
Europe provides an appropriate microcosm to illustrate such a spatial 
taxonomy (Figure 4). Just consider the differences in degree of 
economic development, level and structure of industrialization, inten- 
sity of communication and exchange of goods, etc. between the inner 
countries of the European Community (core) and Europe's periphery, 
e.g., the Ukraine or Northern Africa. 
It has to be emphasized that such spatial taxonomy not necessarily 
implies that regions have to be physically (geographically) close to each 
other. Instead, it is rather the degree of functional integration and 
similar structural and intensity characteristics in the development of 
the economic and technological base which determines whether a region 
is classified as belonging to the core, rim, or periphery. In fact, such 
spatial concepts have also been discussed within the framework of sus- 
tainability, arguing that its criteria may be more appropriately dis- 
cussed over a spatially heterogeneous system, consisting of clusters of 
interacting systems, which may not necessarily be in geographic prox- 
imity to each other (Brooks, 1988). 
When discussing industrialization, we interpret these functional regions 
as follows: 
Industrialization st arts in the core. The core countries subsequently 
display the highest degree of industrialization and also lead in the 
introduction of new technology systems, or of entire "clustersn. Pro- 
cess and product innovations enlarge constantly the industrial base of 
the core and steer structural changes in its industry. Currently the 
core is the most advanced in the transition to a post-industrial, service 
dominated economy. 
The rim has generally lower levels of industrialization, aiming at, and 
ultimately also catching-up to, the industrial core. Its technology base 
is quite heterogeneous consisting at the same time of areas with similar 
degree of sophistication and level of technology as in the core alongside 
more outdated technological vintages. Although exchange of informa- 
tion and goods (to the core as well as other regions) is less intensive 
than withintfrom the industrial core, it nevertheless already partici- 
pates significantly in the international division of industrial production, 
manufacturing in particular. The importance of the industrial sector is 
already quite high and still growing, as shown in structural indicators 
of value added, employment and also in the materials (and smoke- 
stack) intensiveness of industry. 
Finally, the periphery consists of regions with the weakest industrial 
and technological base, and remote from international flows of informa- 
tion and goods. Exports are dominated by primary commodities, 
industry mostly produces for local markets, although islands of "high- 
tech" and heavy smoke-stack industries exist. Structurally the econ- 
omy is dominated by agricultural and service activities, however, 
largely operating outside the formal economy. Degrees of industrializa- 
tion and urbanization are consequently still comparatively low. 
Although such a taxonomy is necessarily a simplification and only 
crude instrument, it may be useful especially to illustrate the large 
disparities in levels and structure of industrialization observed in his- 
tory and continuing up to the present. 
2. The Spread of Industrialization: Technology Clusters, 
Sources of Growth, and Spatial Heterogeneity 
Below we attempt to illustrate that industrialization, embedded within 
a broader framework of economic growth, proceeded through a succes- 
sion of development periods based on the pervasive adoption of various 
"technology clusters". Such a succession is, however, not a rigid tem- 
poral sequence as various LLclusters" coexist (with changing weights) at  
any given period in time. Older technological and infrastructural vin- 
tages coexist with the dominant technology cluster, and in same cases 
previous clusters (compared to the dominant technology base in the 
leading industrialized countries) are perpetuated, as was largely the 
case in the post-WW I1 industrial policy of the USSR. Elements of a 
forthcoming cluster are developed within specialized applications or in 
specific market niches, eventually to emerge as a new dominant techno- 
logical mode after an extensive period of experimentation and cumula- 
tive improvements. 
At any given period of time most of industrial and economic growth is, 
however, driven by the dominant technology cluster, frequently associ- 
ated with the most visible technological artifact or infrastructural sys- 
tem of the time period, and studied under the leading sector hypothesis 
by economic historians [e.g., the "railways eran or the "age of steel and 
electricity" (Freeman, 1989)]. The reason why we emphasize the 
concept of technology clusters in particular is that any dominant new 
sector or infrastruct ural system studied under the leading sector 
hypothesis can explain only a fraction of the economic and industrial 
output growth." Thus, we cannot in any way fully account for growth 
on the basis of single "leadingn sectors, or a few individual industrial or 
infrastructural innovations, as important as they might be. Only the 
combination of a whole host of innovations in many sectors and techno- 
logical fields will yield an appropriate entity to account for industrial 
and overall economic growth. 
During the growth of the dominant technology cluster, many techno- 
logical elements of the next one are being developed through scientific 
discoveries and subsequent small-scale industrial applications. How- 
ever, it takes considerable time before hitherto isolated developments 
converge towards interrelation and cross-enhancing, yielding the for- 
ward and backward multiplier effects characteristic for whole technol- 
ogy clusters. A new cluster emerges eventually after a period of crisis 
of the dominant mode of expansion of industrial activities, involving 
(painful) structural adjustments not only in the economic sphere but 
also in the social and institutional domains. 
2.1. A Qualitative Account of Technology Clusters Since t h e  
Onset of t h e  Industr ial  Revolution 
The tentative four historical clusters, and the possible emerging fifth 
illustrated below, have all important implications for industrial growth. 
New products and markets emerge, transportation infrastructures 
widen existing markets, new process technologies and forms of organi- 
zation and management enable to raise industrial productivity. 
Macroeconomic and social policies provide for a distribution of the 
achieved productivity gains, and rising incomes in turn result in a 
powerful demand induced stimulus for industrial output growth. At 
the same time, energy, transportation and communication infrastruc- 
tures, "meta-systems" by themselves, enable and facilitate the changes 
in industry and consumer markets. 
* For case etudiee of coal, steel, and railways eee e.g., Fiehlow, 1965, Freeman, 1989, Fremdling, 1975, 
Holtfrerich, 1973; OIBrien, 1983; Tunzelmann, 1982) 
Table 3 presents an attempt to categorize various phases of industrial 
and economic development through the concept of technology clusters. 
It lists the dominant cluster in the top row, and the emerging (dom- 
inating in the successive phase) below. Examples of key technologies in 
the areas of energy and transport systems, materials and industry, as 
well as in the final consumer sphere are listed. Finally, we attempt to 
categorize the dominant "organizational style" (Perez, 1983), i.e., the 
predominant mode regulating industrial, economic and social relations, 
and give a geographical taxonomy of centers of industrialization (core) 
and regions catching-up (newly industrializing or "rim" countries). All 
regions/countries not listed separately in Table 3 are classified as 
industrialization "periphery" for the purposes of this discussion. 
Four historical and a prospective fifth future cluster are identified, 
nick-named after their most important carrier branches or functioning 
principles. These are: the textile industrialization cluster, extending to 
the 1820s, the steam cluster until about the 1870s, heavy engineering, 
lasting until the eve of WW 11, and mass production/consumption until 
the 1970s and 1980s. Currently we appear in the transition to a new 
age of industrialization. Both its characterization as "total quality" 
[i.e., control of both the internal and external (environmental) quality 
of industrial production)] cluster as well as the technological examples 
listed are necessarily speculative. 
It has to be emphasized that the classification presented in Table 3 is 
only a crude one and the given examples are illustrative and by far not 
exhaustive. Also the timing of the various clusters in Table 3 is only 
approximative. Below discussion of Table 3 will be brief and 
(over) simplifying, as each cluster and associated period of indus trializa- 
tion would certainly merit the space of a book for an adequate histori- 
cal account. 
1 750-1 820: "Textiles" 
Historically , the beginning of industrialization as a process of structural 
change in which increasing proportions of the national income and 
employment are generated by industry sets in around the middle of the 
18th century in England. Technological innovations transformed the 
textile manufacture in England and gave rise to what became later a 
new mode of production: the factory system. Important bottlenecks for 
industrialization and its concomitant spatial concentration of popula- 
tion and economic activities started to be overcome. Coal and Darby's 
coke combined with the stationary steam engine (particularly 
Table 3. Important Technology Clusters for Economic Growth and Industrialization [(E=energy, T=transport and communication, M=materials, 
I=industry, C=consumer products)]. 
1750-1820 1800-1870 1850-1940 1920-2000 1980- 
Cluster 'textilen 'steamn 'heavy engineeringn "mass production/consumptionn 'total qualityn 
Dominant 
E water, wind, wood, feed, coal oil, electricity gas, electricity 
feed, wood coal 
T turnpikes canals railways, steamships, roads, telephone, roads, air transport, 
telegraph radio k TV multi-media comm. 
M iron iron, steel petrochemicals, plastics, alloys, 
puddling steel steel, aluminum specialty materials 
I castings stationary steam, heavy machinery, process plants, env. technologies, 
mechanization chemicals, NC machinery, disassembly & recycling 
structural materials consumer goods, drugs consumer services 
C textiles (wool, cotton), textiles, product diversification durables, food industry, leisure & vacation, 
pottery chinaware (imports) tourism custom-made products 
Emerging 
E coal, coke city gas oil, electricity gas, nuclear hydrogen? 
T canals mobile steam, roads & cars air transport, telecom- hypersonic? 
telegraph telephone, radio munication, computers high-speed trains 
M puddling steel mass prod. steel synthetics, "custom-maden materials, recyclable9 & 
aluminum composites degradable9 
I stationary steam, coal chemicals, dyes, fine chemicals, drugs, electronics, services (software), 
mechanical equipment structural materials durables information technologies biotechnologies 
C chinaware illuminants consumer durables, leisure k recreation integrated 'packagesn 
refrigeration products, arts (products + services) 
Organizational astyle" 
Plant/company individual entrepreneurs, small firms, 'giantsn, cartels, Fordism/Taylorism 'just-in-timen , 
level local capital, small-scale joint stock trusts, pervasive multinationals, TQC, horizontal 
manufacture companies standardization vertical integration integration 
Economy k breakdown of feudal 'laissez-fairen, imperialim, colonies social welfare state, economic deregulation, 
society & medieval economic Manchester monopoly & oligopoly Keynsianism environmental regulation 
structures liberalism regulation, unionization ' openn society networks of actors 
Indudtrial Geography 
'Coren England England, Belgium Germany, USA, USA, Canada, JANZ OECD 
Benelux, France, England EC-6, England 
'Rimn Belgium, France France, Germany, Central Europe, Italy, USSR, Central & 4 Tigers, Russia, 
USA Scandinavia, Canada, Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, 
JANZ, Russia Southern Europe ?? 
JANZ = Japan, Australia, New Zealand 
important for coal mine dewatering) put an end to fuelwood and char- 
coal shortages and provided for spatial power densities previously 
found only in exceptional locations of abundant hydropower. The 
improvements in parish roads and turnpikes and especially the "canal 
mania" around the turn of the 18th to 19th century enabled to  supply 
the rapidly rising urban and industrial centers with food, energy and 
raw materials. Charcoal and the puddling furnace produced the first 
industrial commodity and structural material: wrought iron. Innova- 
tions in spinning and (after the 1820s also in weaving) enabled drastic 
falling costs and rising output particularly in the manufacture of cotton 
textiles. The introduction of fine porcelain from China gave rise to  an 
expanding chinaware industry. 
The nexus of innovations involving cotton textiles, the coal and iron 
industries, and the introduction of steam power constitute the heart of 
the Industrial Revolution in England. However, in order for these 
developments to take place, important preconditions have to  be men- 
tioned. The first was a drastic increase in agricultural productivity (cf. 
Grigg, 1987; Griibler, 1992). More complex crop rotation patterns, 
abandonment of fallow lands, field enclosures, new crops, and improved 
animal husbandry enabled to raise both agricultural output with at  the 
same time fewer labor. Freed from agriculture, people sought urban 
residence and industrial employment. Another important precondition 
can be found in the institutional sphere. The separation of political 
and economic power, new institutions for scientific research and dis- 
semination of its results, organization of market relations, etc., all mark 
the breakdown of feudal and medieval economic structures with their 
associated monopolies, guilds, tolls and restrictions on trade. Perhaps 
the intellectual and institutional/organizational changes were indeed 
the most fundamental (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986) as enabling and 
encouraging changes in the fields of industrial technology, products, 
markets, infrastructures, etc. Under a general "laissez-fairen attitude, 
no provision was made to  socially smoothen the disruptive process of 
structural change in employment, rural-urban residence, value genera- 
tion and distribution of income. Consequently, it should not come to a 
surprise to  find violent manifestations of social and class conflict. Lud- 
dists and the Captain Swing (Hobsbawn and Rudk, 1968) movements 
provide historical evidence of the painful social adjustment process to 
the begin of industrialization. 
1820-1 870: "Steam" 
In this period, lasting to the recession in the 1870s, industrialization 
emerges from a spatially and sectorally confined phenomenon to a per- 
vasive principle of economic organization. Industrialization continues 
to be dominated by England, which reaches its apogee as the world's 
leading industrial power by the 1870s, accounting nearly for one quar- 
ter of the global industrial output. Industrialization spreads to the con- 
tinent (Belgium, and the Lorraine and the Rhur in France and Ger- 
many, respectively) and to the Eastern United States much along the 
lines of the successful English model (textiles, coal and iron industry). 
Coal (fuelwood in the Unites States) provides the principal energy form 
for industry, whereas transportation and household energy needs con- 
tinue to be supplied mostly by renewable energy sources (wood and 
animal feed). The "steam" period is characterized by the emergence of 
mobile steam power (locomotives and boats), but transport infrastruc- 
tures are still predominated by inland navigation and canals, reaching 
their maximum network size by the 1870s (England, France and the 
USA). Important innovations emerge in the fields of materials (Besse- 
mer steel production), transport and communications (railways and 
telegraphs), and energy (city gas, and the systematic development of a 
coal based chemical industry), later on constituting the dominant tech- 
nological cluster of the period of the second half of the 19th century 
until the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
1870-1 990: "Heavy Engineering" 
Fueled by coal, this industrialization phase is dominated by railways, 
steam and steel. As such constitutes the most smoke-stack intensive 
period of industrialization. Dominated by the output of primary com- 
modities and capital equipment the industrial infrastructure spreads on 
a global scale. Enlarging the industrial and infrastructural base 
becomes almost a self-fulfilling* purpose, driven by economies of scale 
at all levels of industrial production and organization. Standardization 
of mass produced components and structural materials, perhaps best 
symbolized by the Eiffel Tower, is another characteristic of the "heavy 
engineeringn t ethnology cluster. 
* Note in particular the parallels to the industrialization path of the USSR in the poet-WW I1 period as d i e  
cussed below. 
England loses its position as leading (in terms of production and indus- 
trial innovations) industrial core country to Germany and the US. The 
latter emerges as the world's largest industrial power by the 1920s, 
accounting for 40 percent of global manufacturing output (Bairoch, 
1982), 60 percent of world steel production (Griibler, 1987), and 80 per- 
cent of cars registered worldwide (MVMA, 1991). 
Railway networks and ocean steam ships draw even the most remote 
continent into the vortex of international trade, dominated by the 
industrialized core countries. Free world trade, greatly facilitated by 
the universal adoption of the Gold Standard, grows exponentially, but 
its political counterpart is imperialism and colonialism. The industrial 
"periphery" is destined to provide ever enlarging markets for the pro- 
ducts of the industrialized core, while supplying raw materials and food 
(long-distance trade being made possible after the invention of canned 
food and refrigeration). Nevertheless, trade flows are dominated by 
trade between the industrialized core countries and with the industrial- 
izing "rim" : Russia and Japan. 
While the pace of technological change accelerates with the emergence 
of oil, petrochemicals, synthetics, radio, telephone and, above all, elec- 
tricity, the institutional and regulative picture is less progressive. 
Emerging industrial giants, monopolies and oligopolies, perhaps best 
symbolized by Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company, are at  the focus of 
government regulatory efforts, while the social question is only at  the 
very beginning to become tackled. Legislation to limit child labor pro- 
vide for elementary health care, reduce long working days (up to 16 
hours per day) is introduced at  a slow pace and implemented a t  an 
even slower one. The dissatisfaction with the prevailing capitalistic 
accumulation regime provides much stimulus for the further develop- 
ment of alternative theoretical expositions (Marxism) and the emer- 
gence of new social movements (labor movement, trade unionization) 
aiming at a more equitable distribution of productivity gains. The 
penetration of new production methods and technologies and associated 
increasing returns to scale are sustained by high investments, leading to 
significant productivity gains. As the income distribution is favorable 
to entrepreneurs, demand generation is also investment (profit) driven. 
Conversely, labor profits from productivity increases of industrializa- 
tion primarily via increasing employment, and to a smaller extent from 
falling real-term prices of food and manufactured products and rising 
wages. 
The widening "mismatch" between industrial growth and the 
social/institutional framework to provide for a more equitable distribu- 
tion of productivity gains is the main cause of increased social conflict. 
A conflict which begins only to be resolved, by progressively "internal- 
izing" labor costs into the economics of industrial growth, as symbol- 
ized by the social welfare state of the 'mass production/consumptionn 
period emerging in the 1920s, and more fully developing after WW 11. 
It is our contention that much of the present discussion about internal- 
izing environmental costs could find useful analogies in the way new 
institutional solutions were devised to resolve the issue of taking more 
fully account of the social externalities that went along with industriali- 
zation. 
1990-1 980: "Mass production/consumption" 
The post-W W I1 economic growth phase and its unprecedented growth 
rates (particularly between the 1950s to the early 1970s) was based on 
a cluster of interrelated technical and managerial innovations, leading 
to productivity levels clearly superior to what was attainable under the 
"heavy engineering" paradigm. In particular, the extension of the con- 
tinuous flow concept of the chemical industry to the mass production of 
identical units enabled unprecedented real-term cost and price 
decreases and thus mass consumption. Examples of typical products 
include the internal combustion engine and the automobile, petro- 
chemicals and plastics, farm machinery and fertilizers, consumer dur- 
able~,  among many others. Petroleum played a vital role, both in terms 
of its availability at low (real-term) costs, as well as principal energy 
carrier and feedstock in the industry, residential, and especially tran- 
sport sector. The prototype of the associated production organization 
being the Fordist type of assembly line, complemented on the organiza- 
tional level by a separation of management and administration from 
production along the ideas of Taylor's scientific management. Addi- 
tional economies of scale effects were realized by the increasing vertical 
integration of industrial activities and the emergence of enterprises 
operating on a global scale (multinationals). 
From an infrastructural perspective, we have to highlight in particular 
the developments of transport and communication systems. Roads and 
internal combustion engine powered vehicles (cars in market economies 
and buses in formerly planned and in developing economies) have 
replaced railways as dominant transport infrastructures. Air transpor- 
tation and global communication networks (telephone, radio and TV) 
have not only reduced physical distances but also enhanced cultural 
and informational interchanges. Science has grown "big" (de Solla- 
Price, 1963) and has been integrated systematically into industrial 
activities, from industrial R&D laboratories, to product quality control, 
even consumer research. 
Although industrialization has become a global phenomenon an 
analysis of realized growth rates reveals only few examples of successful 
catching-up (notably Japan). Instead, catching-up appears to be more 
a phenomenon within given geographical regions or between regions 
with not too different degrees of industrial development. Thus, 
whereas Austria or Finland have indeed caught-up to the European 
core, disparities in income and level of industrialization between North 
and South America, or between Europe and India have not narrowed, 
in some cases (Africa) even widened. In terms of the spatial taxonomy 
adopted here, this implies that the industrial "coren has somewhat 
grown by members from the %im" (Canada, Japan, Scandinavia, Aus- 
tria, Switzerland, Italy), but the dominance of the core in industrial 
and economic power is as large as ever. The OECD countries still 
account for 70 percent of the world's industrial output (cf. Table 1 
above) and for 75 percent of the world merchandise trade (World Bank, 
1992). Over 80 percent of OECD's imports of manufactured goods is 
imported from other OECD members, another 9 percent from the 
industrial rim (Eastern Europe and 4-Tigers), and only about 10 per- 
cent from the rest of the world (World Bank, 1992). 
Examples of the matching social-institutional framework associated 
with the growth of the oil-based energy and material intensive mass 
production regime of the OECD region include Keynsian policies lead- 
ing to  various forms of demand management, both direct via public 
infrastructure (roads, highways), defense and public service spending 
(in particular health care and higher education) and indirectly, e.g., in 
the form of income redistribution (enabling from the disposable income 
side mass consumption), generally subsumed under the term of the wel- 
fare state. Other examples include socio-institutional innovations such 
as large-scale consumer credits, publicity, development of mass com- 
munication, institutional embedding of labour unions or the develop- 
ment of various forms of L'Sozialpartnerschaft" as institutional frame- 
work of a social consensus on the general growth trajectory. In our 
viewpoint, it is precisely this congruence between technologies and pro- 
ducts and the (supportive) socio-institutional framework, which was 
characteristic for the development phase that enabled the economic 
expansion after WW 11. However, it appears that this widespread 
social consensus is progressively vanishing and that we are witnessing a 
widening "mismatch" (Perez, 1983) between the socio-institutional 
framework* of a particular phase of economic growth and the attain- 
ment of (market, environmental, social acceptance, etc.) limits to its 
further expansion. 
Changing social values, new technologies and growth sectors, new 
forms of production organization, shifts in the occupational profiles and 
the international relative cost advantage all imply the need for struc- 
tural and institutional adjustment processes. The current focus on res- 
tructuring the formerly centrally planned economies should not blur 
the need for similar far reaching social and institutional "perestroikasn 
in the industrialized core countries. Faced with ultimately threatening 
environmental limits to the physical manifestations of our industrial 
metabolism, and obvious limits of traditional "end-of-pipen regulatory 
approaches, human ingenuity is challenged to devise technological, 
organizational and institutional innovations for sustainable growth. 
As many of the elements of such a new path of "total qualityn are still 
embryonic, a further discussion beyond the propositions contained in 
Table 3 above would be too speculative for this paper. Nevertheless, 
we would like to make one observation. Despite industry is a powerful 
agent of global change, consumers matter increasingly more. There- 
fore, industry will have to abandon a narrow focus on the physical 
structures and artifacts it uses and produces if indeed closing the indus- 
trial metabolism is on the agenda. This is simply because even the 
most spectacular environmental improvement in industry or of an 
industrial product can be largely compensated by consumer decisions 
and unchanged behavior in using (and dispensing) industrial products. 
This problem is widely acknowledged in the energy field, where one can 
show that efficiency improvement potentials in end-uses are much 
larger than in industry. However, despite the availability of technolo- 
gies like energy efficient cars or light bulbs, these are only slowly (if at 
all) taken up by consumers. Thus, for improving environmental com- 
patibility we have to redefine the purpose of industry. Instead of pro- 
viding merely products and using industrial technology for their final 
*Boyer (1988) arguea that the Fordist/Tayloristic 'paradigm' after ite univeraal adoption cannot contribute 
any further to productivity growth. The much discussed productivity alowdown ia a reault of the impoaaibil- 
ity to further 'deepen" the Fordiat organizational acheme. New eolutiona (like the Japaneae concept of 30- 
tal quality control", TQC) have yet to become embedded within existing induatrial relation atructurea. 
disposal and recycling (e.g., in "dis-assembly plants" ), industry will 
have to provide integrated services, i.e., instead of a car provide mobil- 
ity, instead of electricity and oil provide for heating and lightning com- 
fort, e t ~ .  This would also be a way out of the dilemma of (implicit) 
high consumer discount rates which has troubled analysts wondering 
why cost effective and environmentally benign investments (like 
efficiency improvements) are taken up by industry but not by consu- 
mers. 
2.2. A Quant i t a t ive  Account  of t h e  Rise of 
Technology Clusters  
How can one empirically account for the rise of the various technology 
clusters discussed in the previous section? The usual approach is to 
take quantitative indicators of the growth of examples of products, 
technologies or systems, considered as representative for the much 
larger set of innovations comprising a particular cluster. Such analysis 
inevitably has to  be partial, and unless appropriate "meta-systemsn of 
importance to more than one sector of the economy (like energy or 
transport infrastructures) are used, could also be misleading as infer- 
ring from specific examples to the evolution of industry or the economy 
at large. In view of abundant literature (e-g., Hoffmann, 1931 and 
1958; Woytinsky and Woytinsky, 1953; Landes, 1969; Rostow, 1978; 
Mokyr, 1990) containing valuable historical data and easily available 
output statistics of principal industrial commodities produced (e.g., 
Mitchell, 1980; 1982; 1983), there is no need to repeat this information 
here. 
Instead, we will discuss two indicators representing aggregates of many 
processes of technological and economic change over time. The first is 
based on an analysis of the diffusion histories of many innovations over 
time in one country (the US), whereas the second one tries to describe 
the growth of the "mass production/consumptionn cluster internation- 
ally based on principal component analysis of a large number of indivi- 
dual indicators. 
Figure 5 reports the results of a diffusion analysis of 117 processes of 
technological change in the areas of energy, transport, manufacturing, 
agriculture, consumer durables, communication and military technolo- 
gies in the USA since the 19th century.* The figure presents the 
* For details see Griibler 1990. 
weighted diffusion rate over time, i.e., the sum of the first derivatives of 
the diffusion functions estimated from empirical data, divided by the 
number of diffusion processes at any given period in time. This yields 
the average rate of technological and economic  change in the USA since 
the 19th century or, in other words, it is the diffusion equivalent of the 
annual GNP growth rate. Rising average diffusion rates indicate the 
emergence of a whole technology cluster; the curve passes through a 
maximum and then tapers off as more and more diffusion processes 
tend towards saturation. A trend reversal indicates the progressive 
emergence of a new cluster, whose initial diffusion rates are however 
still low, exacerbating the period of structural change. It is not coin- 
cidental that the troughs of Figure 5 (lowest rate of technological and 
economic change) coincide with periods of pronounced recession, even 
depression in the US (1870s, 1930s, and since the beginning of the 
1970s). As such the figure illustrates the rise and fall of three technol- 
ogy clusters in case of the US. [The first (LLtextiles") does not show on 
the graphic, because prior to the 1830s the US was basically an 
agrarian society .] 
A second approach follows more a conventional methodology of inter- 
national comparisons of economic development and structural change: 
principal component  analysis. Glaziev (1991) analyzes 50 indicators in 
the areas of agriculture, construction, chemical industry, energy, elec- 
tricity, transportation, and private consumption, over the period 1950 
to 1986. Principle components as aggregation of the overall evolution 
of growth and intensity of the seven areas are calculated, and in a 
second step the principle component of the principle components of the 
first level is calculated. The result - though at first sight difficult to 
interpret as giving a dimensionless indicator - for the US, Japan, FRG, 
the UK and the (former) USSR is shown in Figure 6. The figure shows 
the evolution and intensity of development of the "mass 
production/consumption" cluster of the W W I1 period. It indicates 
that the US has most intensively developed this particular cluster and 
its associated industrial base and consumption patterns. Western 
Europe and Japan have followed suite, albeit at  a lower intensity level, 
and in all the OECD countries the cluster starts to decline in the 1970s 
to 1980s, indicating a slowdown in growth and possible transition to a 
new phase of industrial growth. It is important to note the decisive 
differences in the intensity of the development path of the US, com- 
pared to Japan and Western Europe. Thus, while the OECD countries 
develop along similar lines, with Japan catching-up since the late 1950s, 
the intensity of development is quite different. This finding is con- 
sistent with spatial theories of innovation diffusion and the spread of 
industrialization discussed above. Early starters (the US) have the 
longest growth phase and develop a particular technology cluster more 
intensively, than late-starters, catching-up, but realizing lower intensity 
levels. The fact that the USSR is even below the Western European 
trajectory was to be expected, as it has developed most of the mass pro- 
duction technologies, but only a few of the mass consumption ones. 
Glaziev (1991) calls the USSR development path as one of "multi- 
modeness", i.e., one of the simultaneous reproduction of an outdated 
technological mode ("heavy engineering") alongside with a more 
modern one. The failure of this industrial development policy has 
become apparent by now, and its environmental implications are 
increasingly becoming realized. 
Our discussion aimed to provide some historical and quantitative evi- 
dence about the specifics of successive industrialization and develop- 
ment paths pursued. As a conclusion we caution against rapid conver- 
gence scenarios, especially with respect to  the future of developing 
countries, as desirable from a human development perspective they 
may be. Whereas history indeed provides examples for successful 
industrialization strategies and pathways of catching-up, these take 
considerable time and have to make use of limited opportunity windows 
of development. Initial conditions matter, as does the level of educa- 
tional attainment of the workforce and a supportive socio-institutional 
framework. A careful balance must be found between learning from 
historical industrialization experience and in finding new niches and 
investing in a forthcoming cluster of industrial and economic develop- 
ment rat her than merely repeating out dated or progressively vanishing 
modes of industrial development. 
3. Industrialization: Output and Productivity Growth 
Figure 7 compares three data sets on the growth of global industrial 
output (Bairoch, 1982; Haustein and Neuwirth, 1982; Rostow, 1978) 
Despite inherent methodological and data uncertainties, and 
differences* in the estimates of industrial growth during the early 
industrialization phase, the estimates agree on the basic dynamic pat- 
tern of global industrialization since the middle of the 19th century: 
exponential growth. This however, only applies to estimates of the 
monetary value of industrial output. Its physical equivalent will show a 
different picture as the material intensiveness of industrial value added 
varies over time, and especially in the OECD countries is declining 
since decades (cf. Williams et al., 1987). This "disintensification" of 
industrial activities will be illustrated in more detail in the following 
section on industrial energy and carbon intensity. 
Table 4 summarizes the (broad) geographical distribution of industrial 
output growth, following the spatial taxonomy adopted here. Based on 
Bairoch's estimate, the industrial output of England in 1900 is used as 
normalizing index. Thus, Table 4 indicates that the industrial output 
of England in 1900 approximated that of the entire globe 150 years ear- 
lier. Conversely, global industrial output in 1980 was a factor over 100 
larger than in England 80 years earlier, and an equal order of magni- 
tude larger than global industrial output at the onset of the Industrial 
Revolution. The industrial core region is characterized by persistently 
higher growth rates in industrial output than the rim and periphery. 
Only in the period 1930-1980, the rim shows higher growth rates, as a 
result of it's catching up to the core discussed above. 
The weight of the industrialized core countries in the early phases of 
industrialization was comparatively low. However, by the mid-19th 
century, the core countries have achieved already global dominance, 
accounting for over half of the globe's industrial output. Ever since, 
global industry is dominated by a comparatively small number of coun- 
tries: the core persistently accounts for about two-thirds of global 
industrial output. The relative decline (over the period 1830 to 1870 
even in absolute terms) of the periphery is a negative mirror image of 
the rise of the industrial core. Despite growth rates of about 3.5 
* Aa the Bairoch (1982) data include a epecial attempt to estimate levels of induetrialization outeide Europe 
and North America, it represents in all likelihood a more realistic picture of the dynamica of early industri- 
alization. 
Table 4. The Global Geography of Industrialization (Level of Industrialization UK in 1900 = 100). 
1980 
1750 18 30s 1870s 1920s 1980 1750 
Level in: 
Core 2 20 180 950 7400 3080 
Rim 5 20 40 190 2 300 430 
Periphery 120 145 100 220 1300 11 
World 127 185 320 1360 11000 8 7 
Growth rates, %/yr 
Core 2.6 3.6 
Rim 1.7 2.7 
Periphery 0.2 1.1 
World 0.5 2 .O 
Regional shares, % 
Core 2 10 56 70 67 
Rim 4 11 12 14 21 
Periphery 94 79 3 1 16 12 
All figures rounded. Data source: Bairoch, 1982. 
Regional eharea and factor increase calculated from original data may differ from rounded figures. 
percent annually over the last five decades, the industrial periphery has 
fallen further behind the most industrialized countries (4 percent per 
year growth rate). This means that both the absolute and relative gap 
between the industrial core and the periphery has widened. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss reasons (or possible 
remedies) for widening disparities in levels of industrial development. 
One of the most frequently used lines of argument points to falling 
real-term primary resource prices and resulting deteriorating terms of 
trade. However, one has also to keep in mind the constant change in 
the industrial structure of the core, and especially the falling materials 
intensity of advanced industrialized countries. All told, prices of pri- 
mary resource inputs in highly industrialized or even post-industrial 
economies matter increasingly less. Copper and bauxite even crude oil 
price changes hardly affect industries producing computers, software, 
or other high value density products like aircrafts, and it was especially 
these industrial branches which have shown the highest growth rates 
over the last decades. At the same time, raw materials prices affect 
developing economies not only in terms of import earnings but also as 
cost items to their comparatively material intensive economies. Oil 
price increases have affected the economy of many developing countries 
severely, and subsidized low domestic prices of raw materials are 
widespread phenomena. Thus, the deteriorating terms of trade can 
explain partly why industrial growth rates in the periphery were 
smaller than to be expected based on their factor endowments. How- 
ever, in our view they are insufficient explanation for the persistently 
higher growth rates in the core. Instead, the "success" of the core 
appears more related to its dynamics of industrial innovation and the 
resulting rise in factor productivity in industry. A particular illustra- 
tive case are the improvements in the productivity of the factor input 
labor. 
Figure 8 presents estimates of the improvement in labor productivity in 
manufacturing for a number of industrialized countries. It should be 
noted that the international comparison of industrial and manufactur- 
ing labor productivity is among one of the most complex tasks for com- 
parative economic statistics. Differences in industrial output mix, rela- 
tive price structure, labor qualification, industrial relations, hours 
worked, etc. still await definitive methodological and empirical resolu- 
tions. Therefore, the data presented in Figure 8 primarily serve to 
illustrate the evolution of labor productivity over time within a given 
- 
country, than serving as a yardstick for international comparisons.* 
* We have renormalized the individual country indexee to be roughly equivalent with the prevailing con- 
seneue on comparative international manufacturing productivity, e.g., the estimate8 of Dosi tt al. (1990) for 
Figure 8 indeed confirms significant productivity gains as a secular 
trend in industrialized countries, and as such is perhaps the best illus- 
tration of the impacts of technological and institutional/organizational 
change. 
It may be perhaps surprising for some to see persistent differences in 
the levels of labor productivity in manufacturing among the industrial- 
ized countries (not to mention developing ones). Apparently, distinct 
national industrial systems (in terms of sectoral structure, technology 
base, etc.) with associated institutional settings (working time regula- 
tion, wage negotiation, etc.) have evolved. The cumulativeness of such 
national industrialization paths is responsible for persistent differences 
in productivity despite intense international trade and competition. 
Some of the historical differences can also be related to the relative 
availability of various factor inputs in industry. As in agriculture, 
labor was comparatively scarce for the US industry. Consequently, 
compared to England, the industrial labor productivity was higher in 
the US already at a moment when the US was still a "newly industrial- 
izing'' country, as compared to the world's leading industrial power. 
We will return to  this phenomenon of historical path dependency in the 
following section, when discussing the energy and environmental inten- 
siveness of various industrialization paths. 
4. Industr ial izat ion a n d  Environment  
The environmental implications of industrialization can perhaps best be 
described by Paul Gray's (1989) ('paradox" of technological develop- 
ment. Industrialization has brought unprecedented levels of environ- 
mental impacts stemming from (impact-wise fairly well understood) 
effluents rising with the scale of industrial activities. At the same time, 
industrialization has introduced new materials and substances (e.g., 
CFCs), with hitherto unknown impacts on the environment. But at  the 
same time, technological change that went along with industrialization 
as well as growing incomes generated by rising productivity have also 
enhanced our technological and economic capacities for remedies. 
the year 1977-1978, and the overview of estimates by Broadberry and Crafts (1990) for the year 1985, from 
which we have adopted the median between industry of origin and expenditure baaed estimates. This yields 
for the early 1980s roughly the relation 2,  1.5, and 1 between the manufacturing productivity per hour 
worked in the US; Japan, Germany, France; and England, respectively. For a historical account of industri- 
al labor productivity see Phelps Brown, 1973. 
In fact, the central theme of this section is that industry has built-in an 
inherent incentive structure to minimize factor inputs (enabled by tech- 
nological change). Thus, industry moves in principle in the right direc- 
tion. The real issue is therefore how to accelerate such desirable trends. 
Moving in the right direction means for industry in principle two 
things: (1) minimize resource inputs per unit of economic activity, i.e., 
dematerialization and (2) improve the environmental compatibility 
of the materials used, processed, and delivered by industry. With 
respect to  industrial energy use this means: decarbonization. In the 
introduction to this paper we have concluded that, simply from a quan- 
titative perspective, energy and its related carbon emissions are the 
largest expression of industry's metabolism. This is the reason why we 
will use these areas as illustrative cases below. 
4.1. Energy  and Carbon  Emissions 
Figure 9 shows the evolution of industrial energy intensity per unit 
value added for selected industrial and industrializing countries. 
Although the data set spans only a limited period in time, judged by 
the time scale of industrialization as a historical phenomenon, it 
nevertheless shows the two most important trends: decreasing energy 
intensity in the industrialized countries, and increasing intensities in 
newly industrializing ones. The much higher energy input per unit 
value added in the latter is frequently interpreted as potential for short- 
to  medium-term energy efficiency improvements. However, higher 
energy intensities are in most cases the result of differences in degrees 
of industrialization and resulting differences in structure and technol- 
ogy base of industry. Thus, we have to  replace the temporal dimension 
by a more appropriate functional dimension, taking into account 
differences in levels and degree of industrialization. 
This is reported in Figure 10, where the industrial energy intensity per 
unit value added is plotted against per capita levels of industrial value 
added, as a proxy of the "industrialization metricn between different 
countries. From such a perspective, the energy intensity of the Brazi- 
lian industry is in fact quite similar to  the Japanese at similar levels of 
industrial per capita output. Conversely, the Nigerian example gives 
raise to  concerns: increasing intensities of factor input use, but no 
significant growth in per capita levels of industrial output. The most 
spectacular improvements in industrial energy intensity were achieved 
in South Korea, illustrating that rapid industrial development and 
vigorous efficiency improvements are not mutually exclusive. 
Again, as in the previous discussion of industrial labor productivity, we 
observe only conditional convergence between countries and persistent 
differences between various intensity 'ctrajectories" of industrial 
development (e.g., US versus Japan). Industrial structures and inten- 
sity of factor input use thus arise from an accumulation process and 
from historical path dependency. This does not only apply to  industry, 
but also to the entire economy. Figure 11 illustrates this for the overall 
energy intensity of different economies as a function of per capita 
income. It has also to  be noted that improvements in energy intensity 
have been achieved over extended periods of time even under low 
energy prices. In the long-run, therefore, technological change appears 
to matter more than prices. The data on energy consumption in Figure 
11 also include renewable energy (in particular fuelwood), because of its 
importance in the 19th century for the industrialized countries (in par- 
ticular the US, cf. Schurr and Netschert, 1960) and its continued 
importance for many developing countries today. From such a perspec- 
tive, initially rising intensity in fossil energy use has to be contrasted 
with the significant efficiency gains for the overall economy, when low- 
efficiency uses of traditional energy carriers are substituted by fossil- 
based technologies. 
Initial conditions, development paths chosen, industrial structures and 
settlement patterns as well as different consumption patterns of the 
population that have evolved account thus for persistent differences 
between countries. This historical path dependency is perhaps best 
illustrated by the "high intensity" and "high efficiency" development 
trajectories revealed by Figure 11. From such a perspective, India 
moves in the direction of the French or Japanese development trajec- 
tory, whereas resource-rich China moves in direction of the US develop- 
ment path. However, a t  similar levels of per capita income, the US had 
about a factor 200 lower population than China today. From the per- 
spective of the differences in population density (or rather of resource 
density per capita), it appears difficult to consider the practical (not to  
mention the environmental) feasibility of a US development path for 
China. 
The above discussion is consistent with a typology of industrial 
development emerging from comparative macro-economic studies. For 
instance, Chenery et al. (1986) developed a typology of industrializa- 
tion paths based on a differentiation of three classes of variables: size of 
the economy (small, large), sector orientation (primary versus 
manufacturing), and trade orientation (inward versus outward orienta- 
tion). Over the post W W I1 period, the highest industrial growth rates 
in semi-industrialized countries were achieved in small, manufacturing, 
and outward oriented economies. What is equally important is to note 
that the relative factor productivity with its evolution over time shows 
persistent differences between the classes of countries analyzed. Again, 
conditional convergence is confined to countries belonging to a particu- 
lar typological group rather than between groups. As such, it consti- 
tutes an important differentiation of Rostow's (1978) stage theory of 
economic development. Instead of a linear development model, various 
distinct development trajectories exist. The success of a particular 
industrialization strategy is also contingent on developing at least part 
of the industrial base on the technological productivity frontier. 
Perhaps the former USSR, or China's experience with rapid industriali- 
zation during the "Great Leap Forward" (e.g., steel production with 
backyard crucible furnaces fired with charcoal), can provide some les- 
sons on the feasibility of industrialization based on outdated technolog- 
ical vintages and industrial structures. 
Environmental compatibility of future industrialization, particularly in 
developing countries, should be compared with the historical experience 
of highly industrialized countries. This could provide some guidance 
about possible environmental impacts under a range of industrializa- 
tion scenarios, and to assess their compatibility with the assimilative 
capacity of the biosphere. Therefore, Figure 1 2  illustrates industrial 
carbon emissions as an environmental indicator of industrialization. 
Analog to Figure 10, it shows the industrial carbon intensity versus per 
capita levels of industrialization. Carbon emissions from electricity 
generation are attributed to industry in proportion to the industry's 
share in total electricity consumption and based on the (changing) 
average fuel mix in electricity generation. Overall, the decreasing car- 
bon intensity of industrial activities is dominated by the improvements 
in energy efficiency (i.e., by the decreasing energy intensity as shown in 
Figure 10 above). This, especially, because in the wake of the post 
1973 period the fuel mix in industry, and particular in electricity gen- 
eration, has become more "carbon heavy". 
Another factor explaining the differences between industrial carbon 
intensity and its changes over time are changes in the structure of the 
industrial output. In fact, the energy and carbon intensiveness of 
industrial processes and products varies widely. For instance, about 50 
percent (some 230 million tons C) of US industrial carbon emissions 
result from products contributing only to 15 percent (some 200 billion 
$) of the industrial value added, whereas 50 percent (780 billion $) of 
the industrial value added is produced with only 13 percent (60 million 
tons C) of the sector's carbon emissions. The specific carbon emissions 
per unit value added across different output categories of the US indus- 
trial sector in 1987 range from 2.27 kg C per US $ to 0.03 kg C per $, 
i.e., by a factor close to 70, with the industry average being less than 
0.3 kg C per US $ (Marland and Pippin, 1990). The highest carbon 
intensities per unit value added are shown for petroleum and coal pro- 
ducts (SIC-code 29), followed by primary metals (SIC code 33), chemi- 
cal and allied products (SIC-28), and stone, clay and glass products 
(SIC-32). Overall, the skewed distribution function of the industry 
sector's carbon emissions (Figure 13) indicates that changes in the out- 
put mix have also to be considered (although difficult to model, yet to 
predict). 
The following section illustrates the importance of structural shifts in 
process technologies and energy supply mix in moving in the direction 
of "dematerialization" and "decarbonization" on the basis of a concrete 
example. 
4.2. A Case Study of Ca rbon  Emissions i n  US Steel  Industry 
Figure 14 reports estimates of specific and total sector carbon emissions 
for the US steel industry since the middle of the second half of the 19th 
century. Although minimizing carbon emissions was never on the 
agenda of industry to  date, it is interesting to note the significant 
improvements (a factor 20!) in the carbon emissions per ton (pig iron) 
produced. Even more noteworthy is the secular trend of this decreasing 
carbon intensity, which follows a typical industrial learning curve when 
plotted versus the cumulative output as done in Figure 13. Thus, 
specific carbon emissions decrease by 17 percent for each doubling of 
cumulative output. As significant as these improvements were, their 
rate fell short of output growth. Consequently, total sector emissions 
(including emissions from generation of the electricity consumed by 
industry) increased over time to well over 50 million tons of carbon 
annually, but apparently have already passed through their historical 
maximum. However, the important point here is to realize the scale of 
emissions, if indeed historical output growth would have been achieved 
by simply intensifying existing process technologies and factor inputs. 
The historical role of technology change has been, therefore, twofold: 
first, enabling significant output growth (and emissions) and, second, at 
the same time also averting even worse impacts, due to significant 
improvements in the efficiency of use of factor inputs. 
Improvements in the carbon intensity of steel manufacture was 
achieved by a combination of gradual, incremental and also radical 
changes in process technology (Figure 15) yielding s$nificant efficiency 
improvements, and in the energy supply mix (Figure 16). These two 
structural change processes operating in tandem are yet another illus- 
tration of the importance of interlinkages between different technologi- 
cal systems. Changes in the fuel mix are intimately tied to changes in 
industrial process technology, and both are instrumental for long-term 
energy efficiency improvements. 
For instance, the introduction of modern s tee1 process technologies in 
the 19th century was closely linked to the replacement of charcoal by 
bituminous coal as energy source and reductant. Modern process tech- 
nologies for continuous casting or for flat glass production require con- 
tinuous, clean and high temperature heat sources usually supplied by 
natural gas or electricity. The trend towards increased recycling and 
remelting of metal scrap requires electric arc furnaces and is a further 
explanation of the increasing electrification trend in industry. For 
instance, Nakidenovid (1990) examines the trends towards a higher 
share of crude steel production from electric arc furnaces, concluding 
that by the year 2020 electric arc furnaces could produce over half of 
the global crude steel production. Thus, from a longer term perspec- 
tive, industry also increasingly relies on higher quality (denser and 
cleaner) energy carriers such as natural gas and electricity, also in the 
wake of the post-1973 period this fuel substitution trend has slowed 
down or even was partly reversed. 
As a conclusion from above example, it is important to emphasize the 
holistic nature of measures to accelerate desirable rates of industrial 
dematerialization and decarbonization. Structural changes in output 
mix, in process technologies, and energy supply systems all have to be 
deployed vigorously together if indeed reductions of industrial emissions 
are on the agenda. 
For the future, however, not only measures in industry will be of impor- 
tance, because ironically the success of industrialization is best illus- 
trated by the growth of economic activities outside industry. Increased 
incomes and more free time enabled by productivity increases in indus- 
trial activities gave raise to the service and leisure economy of post- 
industrial societies. It is our contention that the latter activities will 
progressively surpass industry as a potential source of environmental 
impacts, and will constitute an important growing market for industrial 
services and products contributing towards a "greening" of our con- 
sumption habits. 
5. Impacts of Industrialization on Consumption and Leisure 
Industrialization had and continues to have far reaching social impacts. 
Changes in employment structure, urbanization, and above all 
increased life expectancy, rising incomes and reductions in working 
time are examples of social changes directly and indirectly resulting 
from industrial output and productivity growth. Contingent on a 
social consensus, productivity gains have been distributed among rising 
wages and incomes (Figure 17) and reductions of working time (Figure 
18). As a consequence the population in industrialized countries enjoys 
today a level of health and longevity, material well being, and leisure 
time, beyond the imagination of even the most daring social utopias of 
the 19th century. 
Perhaps the changes in time allocation patterns are among the social 
impacts of industrialization least known. That is why we briefly discuss 
them here. Some 100 years ago, a UK laborer had an average life 
expectancy at  the age of 10 of about 48 years and at  age 20 of about 40 
years, i.e., a total life span of less than 60 years. Before education 
became mandatory, labor began young, and essentially men healthy 
enough to work until they died (average length of a work career: about 
47 years). Over his lifetime a male worker worked about 150,000 
hours,' or 60 percent of his available lifetime after subtracting neces- 
sary "physiological" time (i.e., the time required to  eat, sleep and for 
personal hygiene). 
Today a typical male worker in the UK works some 88,000 hours dur- 
ing his lifetime. Due to reduced working time and increased life expec- 
tancy he spends only about 25 percent of his available lifetime at  the 
work place. Trends in working time reductions (at paid work) for 
* All data from Armstrong, 1984 and Flora et a/., 1987. Long-term trends in working time are discussed in 
more detail in Ausubel and Griibler, 1990. 
women have been less pronounced, but nevertheless noteworthy (reduc- 
tion from 63 to  40 thousand hours over the lifetime; the shorter work 
career being the result of part-time employment as well as interruptions 
in child-bearing phase). 
More free time, coupled with higher incomes has led t o  the develop- 
ment of lifestyles centered around private consumption and demand for 
services (cf. Gershuny , 1983). The structure of employment, industry, 
and production has followed suit. It is important to  note to  what 
extent resource consumption in post-industrial societies have become 
dominated by private consumption and leisure activities. Schipper e t  
al. (1989) presents data on final energy consumption for the FRG, indi- 
cating a dramatic shift in the relative share of energy consumption 
between productive (i.e., industrial) and consumptive (i.e., services and 
private households) uses of energy. Industry accounted in 1950 for 
two- thirds of final energy consumption, whereas today it accounts for 
only one-third. 
From an environmental perspective, it is therefore not only important 
how resource and impact intensive industrial activities are, but also to 
consider activities outside industry. Figure 19 presents a tabulation of 
the energy and carbon intensiveness per unit of time of different activi- 
ties of the US population (Griibler, 1992). Working at  the workplace, 
commuting, or staying at  home or at  leisure activities have all different 
implications for level and structure of energy and materials demand. 
International and intertemporal time-budget studies report on a 
broadly converging change in the structure of time allocation of the 
population (Figure 20). The cross-cultural data on the increase of lei- 
sure time relative to paid work (for men) and to  unpaid work (for 
women) confirm the trend towards increasing leisure time, even as 
women continue to  enter the workforce. Whether such changes lead to 
further increases in energy use can be inferred from the types of leisure 
activities selected (i.e., energy intensive activities involving travel, 
versus "sustainable" activities like gardening). 
Perhaps the most important lesson provided by time budget research is 
to acknowledge the complexity of criteria underlying consumer choices 
and preferences. Efficient use of capital and energy are important, but 
if indeed time is the ultimate scarce resource for consumers, policies to 
reorient technological solutions and consumer preferences particularly 
in resource and environmental intensive activities such as transporta- 
tion will have t o  go well beyond traditional intervention instruments, 
such as changes in relative price structures. In our viewpoint, it will 
become increasingly important in the future for industry to take up the 
challenge to  assist consumers in more environmentally compatible life- 
style choices. Not only in providing new [such as (more or less) 
"green"] products, but also ways to ensure that environmentally 
friendly products are adopted and used appropriately. All this implies 
to redefine traditional markets for products and services in the direc- 
tion of intergrated packages, focusing on the delivery of end-use services 
rather than on artifacts. 
6. Conclusion 
To conclude, let us reiterate the three central themes of this paper. 
First, industrialization as a historical phenomenon is conceptualized as 
a succession of phases, characterized by the pervasive adoption of 
"technology clusters". The introduction of a whole host of technologi- 
cal, institutional and organizational innovations leads to productivity 
gains clearly superior to the mere intensification of traditional solu- 
tions. From this perspective, industrialization is a time specific 
phenomenon, characterized by (discontinuous) processes of structural 
change in the areas of economic structure, technological base and social 
relations. History matters because of the cumulativeness of socio- 
institutional and technological change. This results in distinct develop- 
ment trajectories, spanning extremes of "high-intensityn or "high- 
efficiency" industrialization paths, clearly discernible from historical 
data. 
With respect to  environmental impacts, we have argued that minimiz- 
ing factor inputs is an inherent part of the incentive structure of indus- 
try. Improved factor productivity and lowering resource intensiveness 
of industrial production have accompanied historical structural changes 
in industry. This would indicate that industry is moving in the right 
direction, referred here as overall "dematerialization" and energy 
"decarbonization" . This gives reasons to  be cautiously optimistic, 
albeit historical trends will have to be accelerated significantly to 
reduce the absolute level of emissions and environmental impacts. As 
in the past, changes in technology, energy and transport infrastruc- 
tures, and in social and institutional regulatory mechanisms will be 
instrumental. 
If environmental compatibility indeed could become a new dominant 
paradigm of industrial development, future sources of industrial pro- 
ductivity growth will be primarily in this area. Such tendencies will of 
course be first discernible in the most advanced post-industrial 
economies (i.e., the industrial "core"). It is our contention that (as in 
the past) successful catching-up will only be possible if based on tech- 
nological and institutional solutions not in conflict with the dominant 
"industrial paradigm" of the core. Industrial societies have been suc- 
cessful in the past to "internalize" social costs. Competitive cost 
advantage through child labor is not considered a "bad" solution today, 
but simply as n o  solution at all. This illustrates to what degree the 
internalization of externalities can indeed be achieved, but it would be 
illusionary to expect such a pervasive transformation to happen 
rapidly. 
Industrialization has brought tremendous productivity gains, and 
resulting rising incomes and reduced working time, in short: a f i u e n c e  
and leisure. From an environmental perspective activities outside the 
productive sphere (i.e., industry) are becoming increasingly important 
determinants of resource consumption and environmental impacts. 
Furthermore, private and leisure activities are more difficult to steer 
with traditional policy instruments, such as price signals to which 
industry adheres. Decision making criteria of consumers are complex 
and far from the "rationality" concepts assumed in economic models. 
A difference, painfully felt by advocates of energy efficiency programs, 
wondering why economic attractive options are not taken up by private 
consumers. Perhaps this will provide the largest future challenge to 
industry: not providing consumers with products, but with environmen- 
tally friendly integrated solutions to satisfy a particular service demand.  
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Figure 1. Industrialization: a process of structural change. Value gen- 
eration and employment (cf. Figure 2 below) shift away from agricul- 
t ure to industrial activities, manufacturing in particular. Source: 
Kuznets, 1958. 
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Figure 2. Industrialization as a process of change in occupational 
structure: share of work force employed in agriculture (top) versus 
share of workforce in industry (bottom). Note that industry now per- 
forms many activities previously residing in agriculture. Source: 
Nakidenovid et al., 1990. 
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Figure 3. Spatial diffusion of artifacts: cars. Early starters have the 
longest sustained diffusion period and resulting highest adoption densi- 
ties. The Figure reports the results of estimating the diffusion of 
passenger cars worldwide, and for a number of countries. Estimated 
diffusion time (At) and ultimate saturation levels (registered cars per 
capita) are plotted as a function of the introduction date of the auto- 
mobile. The results are consistent with the spatial patterns of diffusion 
described above: late-comers tend to catch up (shorter At), albeit at 
significantly lower intensity levels. The resulting global scenario is with 
up to 600 million cars by the year 2010 significantly lower than fore- 
casts based on linear extrapolation of past trends. Source: Griibler, 
1990. 
Figure 4. A spatial taxonomy of Europe: core, r im,  and periphery. 
The core is characterized by highest levels of economic development 
and intense functional integration (trade and information flows, move- 
ment of people, etc.). Levels of development, degrees of modernization 
of industrial structure, and functional integration thin out from the 
core to the rim, and further to the periphery. Regions are defined on 
basis of their functional characteristics, and not necessarily by their 
geographical proximity. As such, differences in Europe between the 
inner EC countries, North Africa, and the Ukraine mirror disparities in 
industrial and overall economic development on a global scale. Source: 
Griibler and Nakitenovid, 1990. 
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Figure 6. Average rate of technical, economic and social change based 
on a sample of 117 diffusion processes in the US (in percent per year). 
The diffusion equivalent of the annual GNP growth rate reveals pro- 
nounced discontinuities. Rising average rates of change indicate the 
diffusion of an entire "cluster" of innovations, providing the main 
sources for industrial output and productivity growth. Source: 
Griibler, 1991. 
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Figure 6. Dimensionless indicators of the evolution and intensity of 
the "mass production/consumption" cluster (referred by Glaziev, 1991, 
as "forth technological wave"). 50 indicators over the period 1950 to 
1986 are analyzed by a two-step principal component analysis. The 
results indicate similar dynamics of the overall evolution in the OECD 
countries, with the US however showing persistently higher intensity 
levels. The former USSR lags behind and never reaches levels compar- 
able to Western Europe, developing most of the materials and energy 
intensive mass production technologies and sectors, however only a few 
of the mass consumption ones. Source: Glaziev, 1991. 
Growth of Global Industrial Output 
(1913 = 100) 
Hoff mann, 1 965 (update) 
Rostow, 1978 
Bairoch, 1982 (update) 
1740 1780 1820 1 860 1900 1940 1980 
Year 
Figure 7. Growth of global industrial output, a comparison of three 
estimates (index 1913=100), revealing a basically exponential growth 
path since (the middle of) the 19th century. Data source: Bairoch, 
1982, Haustein and Neuwirth, 1982, and Rostow, 1978. 
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Figure 8. Growth in manufacturing labor productivity (in $ per man- 
hour), ratio scale. Comparative productivity levels are only approxi- 
mative, therefore weight should be given only to the relative evolution 
of productivity in a given country over time. Industrial labor produc- 
tivity gains have been extraordinary, and enabled rising incomes 
(wages) and shortening of working hours. Industrial output and em- 
ployment data are from Liesner, 1985, and Mitchell, 1980, and 1983; 
working hours from Maddison, 1991. Productivity figures between 
1840 and 1930 have been harmonized with the estimates of Clark, 1940. 
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Figure 9. Industrial energy intensity (MJ per US $ 1980) for selected 
countries. Note the differences in rising intensities in Brazil and Ni- 
geria and declining intensities elesewhere. Data source: LBL data base 
and IEA, 1991. 
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Figure 10. Industrial energy intensity (MJ per US $ 1980) versus de- 
gree of industrialization [industrial value added (1000 US $ 1980) per 
capita], as a more functional scale to assess the evolution of industrial 
energy intensity. Data source: cf. Figure 9. 
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Figure 11. Total primary energy (including fuelwood) intensity per 
constant GDP (kgoe per US $ 1985) versus per capita GDP (US $ 1985 
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per capita). The Figure shows persistent differences in the energy in- 
tensity of various development paths pursued. The overall long-run im- 
- 
provement rate equals about 1 percent per year. Data source: 
Nakidenovid et al., 1990. 
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Figure 12. Industrial carbon intensity (kg C per US $ 1985 value ad- 
ded) versus per capita level of industrialization (1000 US $ 1980 per 
capita), cf. Figure 10 above. Data source: energy and value added: 
LBL data base, carbon emissions: emission factors based on Ausubel et 
al., 1988; electricity production structure from IEA, 1991. 
USA - CARBON INTENSITY OF INDUSTRY 
Cumulative percent of industrial carbon emissions (%) 
SIC - 29 
-Petroleum & coal 
Figure 13. 1987 distribution of US industrial carbon emissions by car- 
bon intensiveness (kg C per $ value added) for 2-digit SIC-code level 
product categories. The heterogeneity of the emission intensiveness 
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between different industrial products indicates the importance of 
changes in industrial output mix for lowering overall specific industry 
emissions. Data source: Marland and Pippin, 1990. 
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Figure 14. US steel industry: specific and total sector carbon emis- 
sions versus cumulative output. Carbon emissions from electricity pro- 
duction included in proportion of industrial to total final electricity 
consumption. It is particularly interesting to note that specific carbon 
emissions have decreased along a typical industrial learning curve, 
despite minimizing carbon emissions was up to now never on the 
industry's agenda. Specific carbon emissions decrease by 17 percent for 
each doubling of cumulative output. This is result of structural 
changes in process technologies and energy carriers used. Data source: 
Griibler, 1987; IEA, 1991. 
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Figure 15. Process technology change in US steel manufacture (rela- 
tive market shares of different processes in raw steel production). 
Jagged lines are historical data and smooth curves model estimates by 
a set of coupled logistic equations. The dynamic pattern of process 
technology change over time shown in the Figure is almost invariant 
across sectors and countries, also the timing and regularity of such 
technological substitution processes can vary considerably. Source: 
NakiEenoviE, 1990. 
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Figure 16. Structural changes in US steel industry fuel mix (percent 
of final energy). Changes in energy supply structures have accom- 
panied changes in industrial process technologies (cf. Figure 15). Data 
source: 1850-1970: Griibler, 1987; 1990: IEA, 1991. 
Germany 
\;- 0 
Figure 17. Long-term evolution of real wages in industry (index UK 
1890-1899=100). Productivity gains in industrial activities have en- 
abled rising incomes, consumption, and resulting further induced 
demand for industrial products. Source: Phelps Brown, 1973. 
HOURS WORKED PER YEAR 
Hours 
Figure 18. Hours worked per year in selected countries. A second 
result of rising industrial productivity was to enable significant reduc- 
tions in working time. Increased incomes and reduced working time 
(and rising life expectancy) are important social achievements of indus- 
trialization. Data source: Maddison, 1991. 
USA - TIME AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
Time* Final Energy Density 
lo9 hrs 10' kgoe kgoe/hr 
At Home* 835.5* 236.6 0.28 
At Work 291.1 660.0t 2.27 
Services 183.5 152.0 0.83 
Travel$ 107.6 279.0$ 2.59 
Total 1417.7 1328.4 0.94 
10' kg c kg C/hr 
Carbon Emissions 1201.6 0.85 
Excluding sleep 
t Including industry transportation, industrial energy use, agriculture, feedetocke 
3 Only passenger travel 
Figure 19. Energy and carbon intensiveness of different activities for 
the US population. Excluding physiological time (i.e., time required for 
eating and sleeping) each US citizen consumes on average about one kg 
of oil equivalent energy per hour and emits roughly the same amount of 
carbon. Note in particular the high carbon intensiveness per unit time 
of transportation. Source: Griibler, 1991b. 
T I M E  BUDGET CHANGES I N  7 COUNTRIES, 1960s to 1980s 
Leisure 
(m) male population 
(f) female population 
Unpaid 
7-I I I 
work Paid work 
Figure 20. Relative allocation of time budgets to different activities, 
male and female population of seven countries, 1960s to 1980s. The 
Figure illustrates an international and gender convergence away from 
formal, contracted work to unpaid work (e.g., family care) and leisure 
activities. This transition from work to non-work in activity pat terns 
can be clearly discerned also in energy demand statistics. In industrial- 
ized countries today about two-thirds of final energy is consumed out- 
side the productive sphere (i.e., industry) for services and leisure uses of 
energy. Source: Gershuny , 1991. 
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